The New Diplomats: Professor is expert on growing trend of state governments forging their own foreign policy pathways 

In this bonus interview with the Marquette-based editors of the respected political science journal Publius, Dr. Lucia Kovacikova explains how state leaders are influencing America’s role on the global stage through paradiplomacy, pursuing their own goals for climate action, trade and international diplomacy.

As Americans continue to ask how Democrats are responding to the current reality of one-party control of Congress and the White House, part of the answer is coming from outside Washington, D.C. In state capitals scattered throughout the country, governors such as Gavin Newsom of California and Kathy Hochul of New York have announced plans for defending domestic progressive policies at the state level.  

The research of Dr. Lucia Kovacikova, assistant professor of political science, reveals states are beginning to mount their own foreign policies too, through what political scientists call paradiplomacy. In one example, a delegation led by Washington Gov. Jay Inslee represented the U.S. Climate Alliance — a bipartisan coalition of 24 governors that describes itself as “representing approximately 60 percent of the U.S. economy and 55 percent of the U.S. population” —  at the United Nations Climate Change Conference, known as COP29, in Baku, Azerbaijan, last fall. And while governors cannot broker tariff deals with other countries, Newsom has called for trading partners to exempt products made in his state from retaliatory tariffs, citing California’s stability as a trading partner. 

Drs. Paul Nolette and Philip Rocco — editors of Publius: The Journal of Federalism and associate professors of political science at Marquette — sat down with Kovacikova to discuss her research on paradiplomacy and its implications since the 2024 election.  

Publius: During the first Trump term, we saw state governments led by Democrats taking the lead on climate policy negotiations. It already seems clear this will happen again. But your research suggests that paradiplomacy is about much more than partisan conflict.  So, what is paradiplomacy? How does it differ from traditional diplomacy?  

Kovacikova: Paradiplomacy describes international relations conducted by subnational governments. These can be governments at any level of the governance structure, including states, provinces, counties and municipalities.  

Throughout history, we have seen cities, for example, act as dominant hubs of economic, cultural and political activity. But paradiplomacy extends all the way up to subnational governments that exist immediately below the central government. In the U.S. context, these are U.S. states. All governance levels have, at one point or another, been involved in international relations, in areas traditionally called “low politics.” While the level of autonomy given to subnational governments varies by country, issues like the economy, education or health care (which often have an international dimension) have always been linked to the local level. This gives subnational governments quite a large policy agenda, which they can now explore internationally. 

The difference between paradiplomacy and traditional diplomacy is that paradiplomacy runs parallel to the official diplomatic engagements conducted by nation-states. Political science has taught us that nation-states are the primary actors on the international scene, and all international agreements and organizations are focused on the national level. So, we often disregard other international activities as unimportant. But what we are seeing more of in recent decades is subnational governments advancing their core issue areas by participating in what used to be traditionally country-focused international institutions. The U.S. states’ coalition to participate in climate change talks is one example of subnational governments acting internationally and positioning themselves in opposition to their national government.  

Publius: In the United States, a state like California is very likely to take different positions on a number of issues, including climate change and many other policy problems, than the Trump administration. Putting that in a broader context, where in the world do you see paradiplomacy happening? Are there frequently tensions between subnational governments and the national governments? 

Kovacikova: As we are seeing more polarization internationally, we are also seeing more tensions between nation-states and their subnational governments. Paradiplomacy very much reflects that. Some Brazilian state governments, for example, were very active in opposing the former Bolsonaro government — a trend known as “resistance paradiplomacy.” In many ways, we may expect a similar dynamic between the current conservative Trump administration and some of the more liberal subnational governments in the United States. For example, in recent weeks, we have seen U.S. states challenge the Trump administration’s policies in court, including on issues like birthright citizenship. These patterns are much easier to spot in federations as opposed to unitary governments, because of the constitutional structure that gives federal subnational governments powers over certain areas of governance. 

But it is also important to point out that not all relations between the national and subnational governments are conflictual. I would argue that in many issue areas, such as economic development, these relationships tend to be quite cooperative. However, even here, we are now seeing growing tensions as 12 U.S. states filed a lawsuit against the Trump administration’s tariffs. Tensions will likely continue to grow around salient political issues of the day.   

Publius: This is a really fascinating area of political life, and also an area of politics that very few people know about. How did you first come to be interested in paradiplomacy? 

Kovacikova: From 2012 to 2016, I worked within this diplomatic ecosystem as an overseas staff member for the U.K.’s Department of International Trade. I found myself collaborating with subnational governments across all levels of U.K.’s governance structure, including Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. While a majority of our interactions were collaborative, there were a few issues where the subnational governments’ views did not align with the national government’s position. These diplomatic relations fascinated me, and I wanted to learn more.  

Of course, these interactions are not just happening in the U.K., but around the world in places like Canada, the United States, France, Germany and many others. If paradiplomacy is now a regular part of diplomats’ daily lives, we should know more about it.   

Publius: In recent years in the U.S., we’ve seen high-profile coalitions of governors and sometimes individual states engaging in forms of international diplomatic activities on their own, sometimes in contrast to opposition partisans at the federal level. But how  
recent is this phenomenon?  

Kovacikova: I would argue that paradiplomacy is as old as globalization itself. Cities have always served as centers of political and economic life, and modern cities are no different. We cannot discard the fact that metropolitan areas such as London, New York or Tokyo have a huge sway internationally. That same logic also applies to the subnational governments higher up on the governance scale. For example, during the second half of the 19th century, many new subnational governments in the former colonies stationed representatives in London and other major European capitals to promote immigration into their territories. Canadian provinces and Australian states are well known for this form of paradiplomacy, relying on the work of their overseas agents-general in Europe. 

Paradiplomacy as we know it today began after World War II and was focused primarily on economic development. There have been several waves of paradiplomacy, first by North American and Australian subnational governments, and later by European and Japanese ones. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, we began to see subnational governments in emerging economies in Eastern Europe and elsewhere embracing paradiplomacy. 

Publius: What sort of impact do you think that subnational governments will have on important emerging foreign policy issues? Where do you see some of the biggest areas of growth when it comes to paradiplomacy in the coming years? 

Kovacikova: Subnational governments have always been very engaged in economic development and that will likely remain their primary focus. Many have created institutions and structures to help them attract investment and promote trade. However, as polarization increases and as many salient issues come to the forefront — including climate change — we may see subnational governments using paradiplomacy to take on these challenges. Most subnational governments within, let’s say, the United States will not only push for these issues individually but will also tackle them in collaboration with other governments that have a similar agenda. As we have seen with the recent U.S. states-led legal challenges to the administration’s policies, I think we’ll see more coalitions between U.S. states pushing back on the federal government and, simultaneously, using international institutions to leverage their power. 

Publius: What might that sort of leverage look like?  

Kovacikova: I am reminded of political scientists Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink’s “Boomerang” model, in which organized groups in one country can appeal to like-minded groups in another to form transnational advocacy networks. Such an international coalition of actors can then urge an unresponsive government to alter its policies on certain issues. This is an interesting theory that could apply to subnational governments as well. We may see a dual push from both below and above to pressure national governments on salient issues such as the environment. If U.S. state governments form a coalition, they are likely to find global partners and international organizations which can help them put pressure on the U.S. federal government. 

Larger subnational governments are likely to play an important role in the years to come. I think we are going to see California and Texas emerge as subnational leaders within the United States, just like Quebec and Alberta are often the leaders against certain Canadian federal policies, whether those are cultural or political. 

Publius: Your research tells us that subnational governments experience great demand for paradiplomatic activities — but one key issue seems to be their autonomy and capacity. States and provinces don’t have the same kinds of political and institutional resources that national governments do where diplomacy is concerned. So, what allows them to engage productively in international affairs?  

Kovacikova: First, it is important to remember that there are many different types of paradiplomatic activities, some requiring more subnational autonomy and capacity than others. For example, subnational governments can have an internationally focused website, which connects them to a global audience. On the other side of the spectrum, subnational governments can have their own foreign affairs departments, offices abroad and memberships in international organizations. Unsurprisingly, the latter activities require significantly more resources and infrastructure. 

We can argue that, in our globalized world, every subnational government has a reason to engage in some form of paradiplomacy. But not every government has the autonomy or the capacity to do so. At the end of the day, we have to ask whether these governments see certain issues as salient enough to be willing to put their resources into increased paradiplomacy. 

Publius: You’ve mentioned places like Alberta, Quebec and California. Are these the prototypical states or provinces that engage in paradiplomacy? Places that are resource-rich, economically productive and/or have political interests that are asymmetric with that of the national government?  

Kovacikova: Those elements can all be drivers of paradiplomacy. Economic size is always a strong indicator. In addition, in my research, I found that exports — in particular exports of commodities — are correlated with more paradiplomacy and a higher number of subnational offices abroad. This is because subnational governments try to find and maintain markets for their products. It is perhaps unsurprising that subnational governments more heavily involved in the globalized economy tend to have an international economic strategy and even international offices abroad.  

However, paradiplomacy may also be more likely when the subnational governments are “juxtaposed” with their national government. This happens when a different political party controls the national versus the subnational government, leading to political tensions between the two levels. This hypothesis has not yet been statistically proven but has been proposed as one explanation for increased paradiplomacy during specific time periods. We do have clear cases of subnational governments disagreeing with the national government when their ruling parties are in opposition to each other, leading to more international engagement on the part of the subnational government. 

Publius: There have long been premature announcements of the death of the nation-state as the primary unit of international relations. But how do you see the effects of paradiplomacy on national sovereignty in the years to come?   

Kovacikova: Over the last century, we’ve simultaneously seen an exponential growth in globalization and an increasing decentralization within countries. And so, the growing role of subnational governments and the rise of paradiplomacy should not be that surprising. 

But does this really mean the nation-state is going to disappear? I highly doubt that, and I think most people in the paradiplomacy space would say the same. The national government continues to play a crucial role. In fact, we see that some national governments oppose paradiplomatic activities and can ban their subnational governments from engaging in them. Turkey, for example, allows its subnational governments to have an internationally focused website and take part in other low-level activities, but does not allow them to operate international offices abroad. It is not the only country to do so. Similar legislation was previously passed in both Italy and Mexico. So, while national governments will likely continue to dominate the international arena, I also believe that paradiplomacy will continue to grow alongside traditional diplomacy.  

Publius: What do you see as the most exciting unanswered questions in the study of paradiplomacy?  

Kovacikova: I am fascinated by how paradiplomacy has changed over time in the various regions in which it has been adopted — including in developing economies. I am curious if and how paradiplomacy in the developing world differs from paradiplomacy in advanced industrialized countries.  

I am also intrigued by the question of how much the public knows about paradiplomacy and how public demands shape subnational governments’ international engagement. These questions are hard to study, but they are important, especially as paradiplomacy continues to grow. In democracies, we might want to consider whether paradiplomacy is responsive to public demands. If the national government does not represent people’s demands on international issues, can voters shape how their subnational government engages with the world?